Volume 2, 2017
Explore Volume 2 of Law, Politics, Administration featuring rigorous peer-reviewed scholarship on digital governance, anti-corruption frameworks, constitutional harmonization, and administrative reform.
Transnational Regulatory Convergence and Domestic Administrative Autonomy in Emerging Economies
Dr. Géraldine Marchand (Department of Public Sector Governance, Sciences Po, Paris, France), Dr. Malik Al-Hassan (Institute of Public Policy, Hamad Bin Khalifa University, Qatar)
Abstract
The widespread diffusion of global regulatory standards, promoted by international financial institutions and transnational expert networks, has profoundly reshaped the administrative apparatus of developing and emerging economies. This article investigates the delicate tension between external regulatory convergence—designed to facilitate cross-border trade, investment, and financial stability—and the preservation of domestic administrative autonomy and democratic responsiveness. Through a comparative institutional analysis of financial sector oversight and environmental compliance agencies across four distinct national jurisdictions, we examine how local bureaucracies mediate, adapt, or resist standardized global policy templates. Our empirical findings demonstrate that while formal harmonization is often achieved through legislative enactment, actual implementation frequently suffers from severe institutional mismatch, resource constraints, and cultural incongruence. We identify the emergence of hybrid regulatory models wherein formal international rules are reinterpreted through local administrative traditions and informal networks. Furthermore, the study explores the democratic deficit inherent in technocratic rule-making insulated from legislative oversight and citizen engagement. We argue that sustainable regulatory governance requires establishing robust domestic feedback mechanisms that reconcile international commitments with local socio-economic realities, ensuring that administrative efficiency does not come at the expense of national self-determination and public accountability.
Judicial Activism vs. Judicial Restraint in the Balancing of National Security and Civil Liberties
Prof. Dr. Henrik Söderlund (Faculty of Law, Uppsala University, Sweden)
Abstract
The perennial debate concerning the proper institutional boundaries of judicial review becomes intensely critical during protracted national security crises, where executive branches routinely enact emergency counter-terrorism measures that infringe upon fundamental constitutional rights. This article examines the jurisprudential doctrines employed by supreme and constitutional courts when adjudicating challenges against state security legislation. We analyze the theoretical dichotomy between judicial activism—characterized by rigorous scrutiny of executive discretion and robust enforcement of civil liberties—and judicial restraint, which emphasizes deference to elected branches in matters of national defense and intelligence gathering. Through a comparative examination of landmark apex court rulings from Western democracies over the past decade, we evaluate the doctrine of proportionality, the margin of appreciation, and national security deference standards. The research demonstrates that uncritical judicial deference often leads to systemic executive overreach and permanent erosion of constitutional safeguards under the guise of temporary emergency powers. Conversely, aggressive judicial intervention without adequate institutional competence risks undermining public confidence during acute security threats. We advocate for a robust procedural review framework that mandates executive transparency, independent judicial oversight of classified evidence, and sunset clauses for emergency legislation, ensuring that the rule of law remains resilient against authoritarian encroachments during times of crisis.
Technocracy, Democratic Legitimacy, and the Rise of Expert-Led Governance
Dr. Isabella Moretti (Department of Political Science, LUISS Guido Carli, Rome, Italy), Dr. Julian Vance (School of Government, London School of Economics, UK)
Abstract
The increasing complexity of modern public policy—spanning macroeconomic regulation, public health crises, and environmental management—has led to a profound shift from traditional electoral politics toward technocratic, expert-led governance. This article investigates the normative and empirical implications of technocracy for the foundational principles of democratic legitimacy and popular sovereignty. As executive power and agenda-setting authority are increasingly delegated to independent regulatory agencies, central banks, and scientific advisory committees, citizens find themselves governed by unelected experts whose decisions are insulated from popular electoral accountability. We explore the theoretical justification for technocracy, which posits that specialized technical competence and empirical rationality are essential for managing complex socio-economic systems effectively. However, we critique how this model reduces political questions of values, distributive justice, and resource allocation into mere technical problems susceptible to single optimal solutions. Using case studies of supranational economic governance during fiscal adjustment programs, we demonstrate how technocratic insulation fuels political alienation, populist backlash, and declining electoral participation. We conclude by proposing a deliberative framework that integrates expert scientific advice with robust democratic representation and participatory public consultation, ensuring that technical expertise serves as an input rather than a substitute for democratic decision-making.
Whistleblower Protection and Institutional Integrity in the Public Sector
Dr. Takuya Sato (Graduate School of Law, Kyoto University, Japan)
Abstract
The disclosure of administrative corruption, regulatory fraud, and institutional malfeasance by internal whistleblowers represents a critical mechanism for maintaining ethical integrity and accountability within public sector organizations. However, whistleblowers frequently face severe professional retaliation, ostracization, and legal persecution by hierarchical institutional structures seeking to protect their reputational standing. This article provides a comprehensive comparative assessment of statutory whistleblower protection frameworks across major parliamentary and presidential democracies. We evaluate the structural inadequacies of internal reporting channels that require employees to report misconduct through supervisory chains of command where superiors may be implicated in the wrongdoing. The research examines the evolution of external disclosure protections, secure reporting portals, and independent oversight bodies designed to safeguard reporting employees from retaliatory disciplinary actions. Through empirical analysis of public sector whistleblower cases, we identify critical statutory loopholes, such as narrow definitions of protected disclosures, burdensome evidentiary thresholds, and the absence of robust financial and career rehabilitation remedies. We argue that effective whistleblower protection requires moving beyond reactive legal defense mechanisms toward an affirmative institutional culture of ethical openness, mandatory independent reporting channels, and stringent criminal penalties for organizational retaliation. Ultimately, the study contends that robust whistleblower protection is an indispensable safeguard for administrative justice and democratic transparency.
Norm Diffusion and Regional Human Rights Regimes in Latin America and Africa
Dr. Amara Diallo (Department of International Law, University of Ghana, Legon), Dr. Mateo Silva (Institute for International Studies, Universidad de los Andes, Colombia)
Abstract
The establishment and institutional maturation of regional human rights systems represent a cornerstone of post-WWII international law, providing supranational mechanisms to hold sovereign states accountable for human rights violations. This article explores the theoretical dynamics of norm diffusion, localization, and institutional compliance within the Inter-American Human Rights System and the African Human Rights System. While both regional frameworks are anchored in universal human rights instruments, their practical efficacy in enforcing compliance among member states varies significantly due to divergent political cultures, resource endowments, and levels of state sovereignty resistance. Through a comparative jurisprudential analysis of landmark judgments rendered by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and the African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights, we investigate how regional courts interact with domestic apex tribunals. The study highlights the phenomenon of "strategic non-compliance" by member states facing politically sensitive rulings regarding transitional justice, indigenous land rights, and electoral integrity. We analyze the crucial mediating role played by domestic civil society organizations, transnational advocacy networks, and local bar associations in mobilizing domestic pressure for judicial implementation. The research concludes that sustainable norm internalization cannot rely solely on coercive supranational sanctions; instead, it requires cultivating deep-rooted domestic constituencies committed to human rights and embedding regional jurisprudence into national legal educational curricula.
Electoral System Design and Party System Fragmentation in Transitional Democracies
Dr. Bence Kovács (Institute of Political Studies, Corvinus University of Budapest, Hungary), Dr. Elena Dumitrescu (Faculty of Law, University of Bucharest, Romania)
Abstract
The structural engineering of electoral laws constitutes one of the most consequential institutional choices facing nations undergoing democratic transition. This article examines the direct causal relationship between electoral system design—specifically the spectrum between majoritarian plurality rules and proportional representation (PR) formulas—and the degree of political party system fragmentation in emerging polities. While proportional systems are frequently favored for ensuring inclusive minority representation and preventing majority tyranny, extreme proportionality often results in hyper-fragmented legislatures plagued by unstable coalition governments and executive paralysis. Conversely, majoritarian systems promote decisive single-party governance but frequently disenfranchise significant voter blocs and exacerbate regional polarization. Through a quantitative and qualitative assessment of electoral reforms across Central and Eastern European post-communist democracies over the past two decades, we analyze how electoral thresholds, district magnitude, and ballot structures shape party system consolidation. The research highlights the strategic manipulation of electoral laws by incumbent political elites seeking to entrench legislative majorities through gerrymandering and restrictive threshold adjustments. We conclude by offering institutional design guidelines that balance legislative stability with proportional representation, emphasizing the importance of constitutional consensus in electoral rule-making.
Performance-Based Budgeting and Public Sector Accountability: Reality vs. Rhetoric
Dr. Connor MacIntyre (Department of Public Economics, University of Edinburgh, Scotland), Dr. Freja Lind (Copenhagen Business School, Denmark)
Abstract
Over the past two decades, performance-based budgeting (PBB) has been championed by international financial organizations and public management reformers as a transformative tool to replace traditional input-based accounting with results-oriented resource allocation. By linking government funding directly to measurable output and outcome indicators, PBB promises to enhance administrative efficiency, transparency, and public sector accountability. This article critically examines the operational gap between the theoretical rhetoric of PBB and its actual implementation realities across national and municipal administrative settings. Through an empirical investigation of public expenditure reforms in Northern and Western European administrative systems, we analyze why PBB initiatives frequently degenerate into bureaucratic compliance exercises characterized by metric manipulation, goal displacement, and tokenistic reporting. The research identifies fundamental structural challenges, including the inherent difficulty of quantifying qualitative public goods (such as social welfare, education quality, and public safety), the perverse incentives created by tying budgets to rigid performance targets, and the resistance of civil servants to managerial audit cultures. We demonstrate that while PBB can improve internal operational monitoring, it rarely succeeds as a primary mechanism for legislative resource allocation without robust independent auditing and genuine political commitment to strategic evaluation. We conclude by presenting an adaptive public financial management framework that combines performance metrics with professional qualitative oversight and stakeholder engagement.
The Right to be Forgotten and the Collision Between Digital Privacy and Freedom of Expression
Prof. Dr. Katrin Bauer (Institute of Information Law, Humboldt University of Berlin, Germany), Dr. Lucas Moreaux (Faculty of Law, Université Paris-Saclay, France)
Abstract
The codification and judicial enforcement of the "right to be forgotten" (or the right to erasure) within European data protection jurisprudence has fundamentally altered the operational landscape of digital information indexing and archival retention. This article examines the complex normative friction between individual privacy rights in digital spheres and the foundational democratic imperatives of freedom of expression, public access to information, and journalistic freedom. As search engine operators and digital platform intermediaries are increasingly mandated to evaluate delisting requests regarding personal data, we analyze the substantive criteria and balancing tests developed by data protection authorities and European courts. The research investigates the chilling effect that expansive de-indexing obligations impose on investigative journalism, historical archiving, and public scrutiny of political or corporate figures. Through a comparative examination of recent judicial rulings across European and North American jurisdictions, we evaluate the extraterritorial reach of data removal orders and the technical challenges of content filtration. We argue that protecting individual dignity and reputation in the digital age must not degenerate into state-sanctioned historical revisionism or private censorship. The study concludes by proposing a refined judicial balancing test that distinguishes between private citizens and public figures, ensuring that privacy protections do not obliterate legitimate public interest discourse and archival integrity.
Anti-Corruption Agencies and the Politics of Institutional Independence
Dr. Santiago Vargas (School of Public Administration, University of Chile, Santiago)
Abstract
The creation of specialized independent anti-corruption agencies (ACAs) has become a flagship institutional recommendation of international anti-corruption conventions, promoted as the ultimate antidote to systemic public sector malfeasance. However, empirical experience across developing and transitional democracies reveals a profound divergence between statutory independence and actual operational autonomy. This article investigates the political economy of anti-corruption enforcement, examining how executive branches frequently undermine ACAs through budget strangulation, partisan political appointments, legislative curtailment of investigative powers, and targeted harassment of anti-corruption prosecutors. Through a comparative institutional evaluation of ACA performance in Latin American and Asian jurisdictions, we analyze the structural preconditions required to insulate anti-corruption investigators from political interference. The research demonstrates that formal legal guarantees of independence are insufficient without robust societal backing, judicial protection, and secure multi-year budgetary allocations independent of executive appropriation. We examine the phenomenon of "selective prosecution," wherein compromised political elites weaponize anti-corruption bodies to target political opponents while shielding allies from scrutiny. The study concludes with a normative institutional design matrix aimed at strengthening oversight mechanisms, guaranteeing tenure security for agency directors, and fostering independent civil society coalitions to defend anti-corruption institutions against executive subversion.
Constitutional Identity and Supranational Integration: The Jurisprudential Clash
Dr. Nikolas Papadopoulos (Faculty of Law, Aristotle University of Thessaloniki, Greece), Dr. Franziska Meier (Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law, Heidelberg, Germany)
Abstract
The ongoing evolution of supranational integration—exemplified by European Union law and regional economic communities—has increasingly intersected with the doctrine of "constitutional identity," asserting the inviolability of core national constitutional principles against intrusive supranational harmonization mandates. This article investigates the theoretical and doctrinal mechanics of constitutional identity as articulated by domestic apex courts seeking to carve out sovereign boundaries against the supremacy of supranational legal orders. We analyze landmark constitutional jurisprudence from diverse member states that invoke national identity clauses as ultimate counter-limits to the binding authority of regional courts. The research explores the inherent friction between the monistic universalism of supranational legal integration and the pluralistic particularism of national constitutional traditions regarding fundamental rights standards, democratic structures, and state sovereignty. We evaluate the risk of judicial fragmentation and legal uncertainty when national courts arrogate the unilateral authority to determine the permissible limits of supranational law. Furthermore, the paper analyzes the political weaponization of constitutional identity by populist governments seeking to justify democratic backsliding and non-compliance with regional human rights obligations. We conclude by advocating for an intensified judicial dialogue and cooperative constitutionalism that reconciles regional integration with respect for legitimate national constitutional pluralism.
Civic Education, Political Efficacy, and Democratic Resilience in Modern Societies
Dr. Siobhan O'Connor (Department of Political Science, Trinity College Dublin, Ireland)
Abstract
The long-term vitality and resilience of democratic governance depend fundamentally on the political literacy, critical engagement, and civic competence of the citizenry. In an era marked by rising political polarization, misinformation campaigns, and democratic erosion, formal and informal civic education initiatives have assumed unprecedented urgency. This article investigates the empirical relationship between structured civic education curricula, internal political efficacy, and democratic resilience across established and emerging polities. Utilizing longitudinal survey data and experimental educational interventions, we evaluate how curriculum design emphasizing participatory debate, media literacy, institutional mechanics, and critical constitutional analysis impacts young citizens' political attitudes and voting behavior. The research demonstrates that traditional civics pedagogy focusing solely on rote memorization of governmental structures fails to foster meaningful political efficacy or democratic commitment. Conversely, interactive curricula incorporating experiential community engagement, simulated legislative debates, and critical analysis of political propaganda significantly enhance trust in democratic institutions and political participation. We analyze the structural barriers facing civic education in underfunded school districts and discuss the corrosive impact of partisan political interference on educational neutrality. The study concludes with evidence-based recommendations for modernizing national civic education frameworks to inoculate democratic societies against populist demagoguery and extremist polarization.
Public Procurement Fraud and the Regulation of Municipal Contracting
Dr. Henri Lefebvre (Institute of Public Administration, University of Strasbourg, France), Dr. Daria Kowalczyk (Warsaw School of Economics, Poland)
Abstract
Public procurement accounts for a substantial percentage of national GDP across developed and developing economies, representing a massive flow of public funds dedicated to infrastructure development, service delivery, and goods acquisition. Consequently, public procurement constitutes one of the most vulnerable sectors for corruption, bid-rigging, cartel formation, and administrative fraud. This article investigates the legal and administrative mechanisms designed to regulate municipal and national contracting processes to ensure competitive integrity, transparency, and value for money. We analyze the common modalities of procurement fraud, including bid rotation, market allocation schemes, specification tailoring, and unauthorized contract modifications. Through a comparative evaluation of public procurement laws in European jurisdictions, we examine the efficacy of centralized e-procurement platforms, mandatory open tendering thresholds, and mandatory conflict-of-interest disclosures for procurement officials. The research highlights the persistent vulnerabilities of municipal-level contracting, where decentralized oversight and limited auditing capacity create fertile ground for local patronage networks. We argue that combating procurement fraud requires moving beyond paper-based compliance checks toward data-driven anomaly detection algorithms, rigorous supplier blacklisting protocols, and robust criminal liability frameworks for corporate entities engaging in collusive bidding practices. Ultimately, the study demonstrates that transparent procurement administration is vital for safeguarding public finances and restoring citizen trust in state expenditure management.
Universal Jurisdiction and the Prosecution of International Crimes in Domestic Courts
Dr. Kofi Mensah (Department of International Law, University of Ghana, Legon), Dr. Astrid Lindner (Institute for International Humanitarian Law, Geneva, Switzerland)
Abstract
The doctrine of universal jurisdiction authorizes domestic courts of any state to prosecute perpetrators of grave international crimes—including war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide, and torture—regardless of the geographic location of the offense and the nationality of the perpetrator or victims. This article examines the theoretical foundations, practical implementation, and geopolitical controversies surrounding the exercise of universal jurisdiction in domestic judicial systems. As international criminal tribunals such as the International Criminal Court face resource constraints and jurisdictional limitations, national prosecutors in several European states have increasingly stepped forward to fill the impunity gap by initiating extraterritorial prosecutions against high-ranking officials from foreign regimes. We analyze the legislative frameworks governing universal jurisdiction across civil and common law traditions, evaluating the distinction between absolute and conditional forms of universal jurisdiction. The research addresses significant procedural and diplomatic hurdles, including sovereign immunity doctrines, extradition disputes, gathering evidence in active conflict zones, and the risk of politically motivated prosecutions. We argue that universal jurisdiction serves as an indispensable pillar of international criminal justice and accountability, demonstrating that perpetrators of atrocity crimes can find no safe haven. The study concludes by proposing harmonized international guidelines to facilitate inter-state judicial cooperation and ensure that universal jurisdiction is exercised in accordance with rigorous due process standards.
Urban Governance and Participatory Budgeting in Megacities
Dr. Mariana Costa (Institute of Urban Studies, Universidade de São Paulo, Brazil), Dr. Liam Ó'Riain (School of Geography and Public Policy, University College Cork, Ireland)
Abstract
The rapid and unprecedented urbanization characterizing contemporary global demographics has concentrated millions of citizens within sprawling megacities, presenting municipal authorities with staggering governance, infrastructure, and resource allocation challenges. Traditional representative municipal governance frequently struggles to address hyper-local community needs, leading to spatial segregation, infrastructural neglect, and profound civic alienation among marginalized urban populations. This article investigates the theory and practical implementation of participatory budgeting (PB) as an innovative democratic instrument designed to devolve direct fiscal allocation authority to grassroots neighborhood assemblies. Originating in Latin America and subsequently diffused globally across European and North American metropolitan centers, PB empowers citizens to deliberate, prioritize, and vote directly on municipal capital expenditure projects. Through a comparative case study of participatory budgeting initiatives in major global metropolises, we evaluate the institutional conditions that determine whether PB achieves genuine democratic empowerment or degenerates into a tokenistic co-optation exercise controlled by municipal elites. The research highlights critical obstacles, including socioeconomic inequalities in civic participation, bureaucratic resistance from entrenched municipal technocrats, and partisan capture of assembly processes. We conclude by presenting an inclusive urban governance framework that integrates digital civic platforms with traditional face-to-face neighborhood deliberations, ensuring equitable resource distribution and enhanced social cohesion in complex megacities.
Administrative Neutrality and the Politicization of Civil Service Appointments
Dr. Hiroshi Nakamura (Graduate School of Public Policy, University of Tokyo, Japan), Dr. Sarah Jenkins (Department of Politics, University of Melbourne, Australia)
Abstract
The Weberian ideal of a professional, merit-based, and politically neutral civil service has long served as the foundational bedrock of modern constitutional administration, ensuring institutional continuity, expert policy advice, and impartial enforcement of state laws regardless of electoral shifts in government. However, contemporary administrative systems face mounting pressure from the creeping politicization of senior civil service appointments, wherein incoming executive administrations bypass meritocratic recruitment channels to install loyal partisans into key bureaucratic leadership positions. This article investigates the theoretical and empirical consequences of bureaucratic politicization across diverse parliamentary and presidential governance models. We analyze the tension between political responsiveness—the desire of elected executives to ensure that administrative agencies enthusiastically implement their policy agenda—and administrative neutrality, which safeguards professional integrity and institutional memory. Through a comparative empirical evaluation of civil service reforms in OECD and emerging nations over the past decade, we examine how excessive politicization degrades policy analysis quality, lowers morale among career civil servants, and fosters systemic corruption through patronage appointments. The research highlights the institutional safeguards necessary to preserve meritocracy, including independent civil service commissions, transparent competitive recruitment examinations, and statutory tenure protections for senior administrative posts. We conclude by offering a balanced administrative model that accommodates executive leadership direction while vigorously defending the professional ethics and operational neutrality of the state bureaucracy.