Reasoning in Judicial Decisions: Between the Trial Judge's Discretion and Supreme Court Review

Abstract

This article examines the duty to state reasons as the point at which the trial judge's freedom to form a judicial conviction meets the Supreme Court's power to review the soundness of judicial decision-making. It proceeds from the premise that stating reasons is not an external restriction on judicial discretion. Rather, it is a condition for its lawful exercise. Discretion can be distinguished from arbitrariness only through the reasons disclosed by the judge. This principle is reflected in Article 169 of the Constitution, which requires judicial judgments and orders to be reasoned, and in Article 174, which protects litigants against judicial arbitrariness. The study mainly adopts an analytical approach to the provisions governing this duty. Particular attention is given to Article 277 of the Code of Civil and Administrative Procedure, which requires judgments to be reasoned "as to the facts and the law" and to address "all claims and grounds raised", as well as paragraphs 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, and 17 of Article 358. The analysis is supported by a comparative approach. The study concludes that Supreme Court review does not concern factual assessment in itself. It concerns the judicial reasoning through which that assessment is articulated. Yet review reaches the outcome of the assessment when the reasons are insufficient, contradictory, or lack a legal basis. The most serious practical defect is formulaic reasoning. It may satisfy the formal structure of the duty while defeating its purpose. The article therefore proposes several specific legislative and practical reforms.